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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to explore the voluntary use of internal audit by Australian
publicly listed companies and to identify factors that lead listed companies to have an internal audit
function.
Design/methodology/approach – Drawing on the Institute of Internal Auditors’ definition of
internal auditing, the paper predicts that internal audit use is associated with factors related to risk
management, strong internal controls and strong corporate governance. To test the predictions, the
study combines data from a survey of listed companies with information from corporate annual
reports. The paper also provides descriptive information on the use of internal audit.
Findings – The results indicate that only one-third of the sample companies use internal audit. While
size appears to be the dominant driver, there is also a strong association between internal audit and the
level of commitment to risk management. However, the study finds only weak support for an
association between the use of internal audit and strong corporate governance.
Research limitations/implications – A limitation of our study is that some of the variables in the
model may not be good proxies for the factors being measured. Refinement of the model and the
variables used provides an opportunity for future research.
Practical implications – The limited use of internal audit by Australian companies has important
implications for sound corporate governance.
Originality/value – This is the first study that identifies factors associated with the use of internal
audit by Australian listed companies.
Keywords Auditing, Corporate governance, Risk management, Australia
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
In 1987, the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting in the United
States (US) recommended that “all companies should maintain an effective internal
audit function” (Treadway, 1987, p. 37). Since that time, corporate governance
committees around the world have reiterated this recommendation (Committee on
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Corporate Governance, 2001; New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National
Association of Security Dealers (NASD), 1999; Cadbury Report, 1992; COSO Report,
1992). Furthermore, the NYSE has endorsed the proposals of its Corporate
Accountability and Listing Standards Committee (NYSE, 2002) that all companies
listed on the NYSE should be required to have their own internal audit function.
However, research by Carcello et al. (2002, p. 302) suggests “a possible under-emphasis
on internal audit” by US companies. In Australia, in spite of a commitment to strong
corporate governance by regulators, many listed companies do not appear to engage in
internal audit activities (Carey et al., 2000a). Thus, the purpose of our study is to
document the current use of internal audit by Australian listed companies and to
identify whether internal audit use is associated with a commitment to risk
management, control and corporate governance. This is an interesting research
question in view of the well-publicized corporate collapses which have focused global
attention on corporate governance and the need to strengthen internal controls.
Prior internal audit research has explored objectivity issues (Brody and Lowe,
2000; Brody and Kaplan, 1996; Church and Schneider, 1991, 1992), the relationships
between internal and external auditors (Felix et al., 2001; Carey et al., 2000a; Brody
et al., 1998; Lampe and Sutton, 1994; Stein et al., 1994) and the trend of
outsourcing internal audit activities (Caplan and Kirschenheiter, 2000; Widener and
Selto, 1999). Some recent studies have also explored the relationship between
internal audit and the audit committee (Goodwin, 2003; Raghunandan et al., 2001;
Goodwin and Yeo, 2001).
However, research examining why companies choose to use internal audit has been
scant. Wallace and Kreutzfeldt (1991) identify characteristics that could influence a
company’s decision to create an internal audit function based on a sample of Arthur
Andersen & Co. clients in 1983. Anderson et al. (1993) examine the effect of firms’
production-investment attributes on a combination of monitoring mechanisms
including internal auditing, while Carey et al. (2000b) focus on the voluntary
demand for both internal and external audit in Australian family companies. Ettredge
et al. (2000) explore the substitution of internal auditing for external auditing using
time-series data. All of these studies use agency theory to explain the use of internal
audit as a monitoring mechanism to reduce agency costs (Adams, 1994).
Carcello et al. (2005) is, to our knowledge, the only other study to explore the factors
associated with public companies’ investment in internal audit. Based on a sample of
224 mid-size US public companies, they find that internal audit budgets are positively
associated with firm size, operating cash flows and more involved audit committees.
Our study makes an important contribution to this growing body of literature. We
not only explore the factors associated with the existence of an internal audit function
but we also provide additional descriptive information on the use of internal audit in a
voluntary setting. We use a unique data set which combines data collected from
publicly available sources with survey data from listed companies. In addition, the
study is undertaken in an institutional environment where there is no requirement for
listed companies to have either an audit committee or an internal audit function. In
Australia, the only requirement in 2000, the year of the study, was an Australian Stock
Exchange (ASX) listing rule specifying that companies without an audit committee
must explain in their annual report why a committee has not been put in place[1].
There was no similar requirement concerning internal audit[2].
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical
background of the study and the development of hypotheses and research questions.
This is followed by sections on the research method, results and conclusion.
Theoretical background and hypothesis development
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) defines internal auditing as:
. . .an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and
improve an organization’s operations. It helps an organization accomplish its objectives by
bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk
management, control, and governance processes. (IIA, 1999)
This definition is designed to embrace the expanding role of internal audit which in
recent years has evolved from a narrow focus on control to include risk management
and corporate governance (Walker et al., 2003; Brody and Lowe, 2000). We use the
definition as a framework to develop hypotheses concerning the characteristics of
companies that use internal audit. While there is considerable overlap between the
areas of risk management, control and governance (Colbert, 2002; McNamee and Selim,
1999), we consider each aspect separately.
Internal audit as a risk management mechanism
Internal auditors can add value to the entity by providing assurance that its risk
exposures are properly understood and managed (Walker et al., 2003; Leithhead, 1999).
Internal audit should play a key role in monitoring a company’s risk profile and
identifying areas to improve risk management processes (Lindow and Race, 2002). As
Walker et al. (2003, p. 52) assert, internal audit can “help organizations identify and
evaluate risks, moving the profession into the front line of risk management”. We
would therefore expect there to be a link between the use of internal audit and the
company’s commitment to sound risk management.
A strong organizational commitment to managing risks requires the development
of a risk-based culture within the company (Kwan, 1999). Such a culture is established
by the practices of senior management and the board of directors (Steinmetz and
Arthus, 2001) and should result in the development of an integrated risk management
framework (Kwan, 1999). One indication of an integrated framework is the existence of
a separate committee or group responsible for risk management, comprised of directors
and senior management. Internal audit can then provide the required support to ensure
that internal controls are in place to adequately monitor the identified risks. We
therefore predict that those companies that have established a separate risk
management committee are more likely to make use of internal audit. This leads to the
following hypothesis:
H1. The existence of an internal audit function is positively associated with the
use of a separate risk management committee.
However, the role that internal audit plays in risk management is complicated by the
possibility that the company may establish alternative mechanisms that either
complement or substitute for internal audit. For example, there may be a designated
risk manager responsible for overseeing and coordinating the risk management
process. That manager may work closely with internal audit, suggesting a positive
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association. Alternatively, the manager may have his/her own staff working in risk
management, eliminating or minimizing the need for internal audit. Thus, we test
whether there is an association between the existence of a designated risk manager and
the use of internal audit, but do not predict a direction.
H2. The existence of an internal audit function is associated with the use of a
designated risk manager.
A company’s commitment to risk management is also likely to be associated with the
nature and extent of business risks to which it is exposed. While companies in all
industries face a wide range of business risks, some industries are considered to be
inherently more risky than others. For example, financial institutions, embracing
banks, credit unions and insurance companies are faced with unique business and
operational risks (Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA), 2005). APRA,
which regulates the industry, has recently proposed that all institutions which it
regulates should have an internal audit function because “internal audit provides a
fundamental risk management ‘check and balance’ function for the board” (APRA,
2005, p. 13). While no such requirements were in place at the time of our study, we
would nonetheless expect institutions in this industry to use internal audit as part of
their commitment to risk management. We therefore test the following hypothesis:
H3. The existence of an internal audit function is positively associated with firms
in the finance industry.
In addition to business risks, companies also face risks associated with fraudulent or
erroneous financial reporting. Internal audit has traditionally been involved in
ensuring that controls are in place to produce reliable financial reports (Kaplan and
Reckers, 1995; Rezaee, 1995). Material misstatements in financial reports are more
likely to be associated with high levels of accounts receivable and inventories (Francis
and Stokes, 1986; Simunic, 1980). Hence, we could expect the use of internal audit to be
positively associated with those companies with a higher proportion of receivables and
inventories. Again, however, the situation is complicated by the possibility of a
trade-off between alternative monitoring mechanisms, in this case internal and
external auditing (Anderson et al., 1993). Companies faced with high financial
statement risk may choose to use more external auditing, either to complement or
substitute for internal monitoring. We therefore expect an association between the use
of internal audit and the level of receivables and inventories relative to total assets, but
we do not predict a direction. This gives rise to the following hypothesis:
H4. The existence of an internal audit function is associated with firms with a
higher proportion of receivables and inventories to total assets.
Internal audit as a control mechanism
Internal control is the process adopted by the directors and management of an entity
to provide reasonable assurance that the objectives of the entity are achieved with
regard to operations, financial reporting and compliance with regulations (COSO
Report, 1992). External auditing standards (e.g. ISA, 400 and AUS, 402) recognize
that an effective internal audit function can significantly strengthen the control
environment by
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(1) reviewing the internal control structure;
(2) monitoring the operations of the information system and control procedures on
behalf of management (AUS 402 19(d)).
As a result of the asymmetry of information between senior managers and division
managers (San Miguel and Govindarajan, 1984; Fama, 1980), senior managers can lose
their ability to tightly control operations. This problem is compounded by the existence
of internal agency costs (Ettredge et al., 2000) that arise because of differences in
incentives between senior managers and lower level staff. Hence, it is important to
have in place a strong system of internal control, which may include the use of internal
audit as a review and monitoring mechanism. In this way, senior management may
delegate their responsibilities with respect to internal control to the internal audit
function (San Miguel and Govindarajan, 1984; Chambers, 1981).
Loss of direct control by senior management is more likely to occur in large,
decentralized firms and thus we predict that the use of internal audit and the size of the
internal audit function are associated with both the size[3] and the complexity of the
firm (Wallace and Kreutsfeldt, 1991). We therefore test the following hypotheses:
H5. The existence of an internal audit function is positively associated with
firm size.
H6. The existence of an internal audit function is positively associated with the
complexity of the firm’s business structures.
Internal audit as an internal governance mechanism
From an agency perspective, the importance of strong governance stems from the need
to align the interests of management with other stakeholders in the firm in order to
reduce agency costs (Cohen et al., 2002). Various corporate governance mechanisms
can be used to monitor management’s behaviour and these include independent
directors on the board[4], an independent board chair, an effective audit committee and
both external and internal audit (Davidson et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2004). Cohen et al.
(2004) describe the complex interactions between these governance mechanisms as the
“corporate governance mosaic” (p. 88).
Anderson et al. (1993) argue that internal audit is a substitute mechanism for
monitoring by directors. However, information asymmetry problems between
executive and independent directors suggest that internal audit is more likely to be
a complementary mechanism. This is supported by research evidence examining the
relationship between internal audit and audit committees (Carcello et al., 2005;
Goodwin, 2003; Raghunandan et al., 2001; Scarbrough et al., 1998) and is also consistent
with the IIA view that internal auditing helps an organization to evaluate and improve
other governance processes (IIA, 1999, 2004). Hence, we expect a positive association
between the use of internal audit and both an independent board chair and the
proportion of independent directors on the board. We also expect a positive association
between the internal audit function and a strong audit committee because the goals of
both are “closely intertwined” (Scarbrough et al., 1998, p. 53). While a strong internal
audit function can enhance the effectiveness of the audit committee (Bishop et al. 2000;
NYSE and NASD, 1999; Turner, 1999), an effective audit committee in turn strengthens
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the position of the internal audit function (Braiotta, 1999; Verschoor, 1992). Following
prior research, an effective committee is assumed to be the one that meets frequently
and is comprised of independent and appropriately experienced directors (DeZoort
et al., 2002). The following hypotheses are therefore tested:
H7. The existence of an internal audit function is positively associated with an
independent board chair.
H8. The existence of an internal audit function is positively associated with the
proportion of independent directors on the board.
H9. The existence of an internal audit function is positively associated with the
existence of an audit committee.
H10. The existence of an internal audit function is positively associated with the
effectiveness of the audit committee.
Control variables
We have noted that companies are more likely to use internal audit when agency costs
are high (Adams, 1994). We therefore include a number of control variables which have
been shown to affect agency costs and which have not been addressed in our hypotheses.
Agency costs are expected to be higher when senior management’s shareholdings
are proportionately lower because this results in less alignment of shareholder and
management interests (Ettredge et al., 1994; Menon and Williams, 1994). They are also
expected to be higher when there is a smaller concentration of large shareholders as
these shareholders can more directly monitor the activities of management (Collier and
Gregory, 1999). A higher level of debt increases agency costs (Watts and Zimmerman,
1986; Chow, 1982; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) because of the incentives for managers to
transfer wealth from debtholders to shareholders (Klein, 2002; Ettredge et al., 1994;
Bradbury, 1990). Further, a high level of growth opportunities has been argued to
increase agency costs of debt because wealth transfers between shareholders and
debtholders are more difficult when firms have a greater proportion of assets-in-place
(Collier, 1993; Anderson et al., 1993). This is because assets-in-place are more likely to
be used in debt covenants to restrict opportunistic behaviour by management on behalf
of shareholders (Anderson et al., 1993). We therefore include variables relating to
director shareholdings, shareholder concentration, debt and assets-in-place as control
variables in our model.
While theory suggests that increased agency costs lead to greater monitoring and
thus the need for internal audit, the issue is complicated by the possibility of a
substitution effect between internal auditing and external auditing (Ettredge et al.,
2000; Carey et al., 2000b; Anderson et al., 1993). This is likely to be the case when the
external auditor relies on the work of internal audit to reduce the level of substantive
testing (Felix et al., 2001). However, studies which focus only on the use of internal
audit rather than on its contribution to the external audit have found a positive
association between internal audit and audit fees (Hay and Knechel, 2002; Carey et al.,
2000a), suggesting that internal and external audit may be used as complementary
mechanisms to increase overall monitoring.
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It is also possible that the use of internal audit is associated with external audit
quality either as an alternative monitoring mechanism, substituting for a higher
quality auditor or as a complementary mechanism, strengthening overall governance.
We therefore also include the level of audit fees and the use of a Big Five auditor[5] as
control variables in our model.
The size of the internal audit function
The above hypotheses examine factors that are associated with the existence of an
internal audit function without considering the size of the function. We therefore
conduct additional analysis to explore whether the extent of internal audit use, as
measured by the size of the function, is also associated with variables linked to risk
management, internal control and corporate governance. We focus only on those
companies with an internal audit function to avoid distorting our analysis by the large
number of companies that do not use internal audit. In view of the smaller sample size,
this additional analysis is exploratory and we do not test formal hypotheses.
Research method
Sample and data collection
Our sample comprises 450 firms drawn from the University of Queensland-KPMG
Centre for Business Forensics Database[6]. This database consists of information on
490 firms that responded to a survey sent to all companies listed on the Australian
Stock Exchange in October 2000. The survey collected data on the company’s use of
internal audit, the size of the internal audit function[7], the existence of a separate risk
management committee and the use of a designated risk manager. This information
was combined with financial and non-financial data from company annual reports.
Financial data included variables concerning size, profitability, liquidity and risk.
Non-financial data related to corporate governance variables and variables relating to
the complexity and riskiness of the entity. Owing to missing data and difficulties
collecting some of the non-financial variables, 40 firms were dropped from the analysis,
giving a final sample of 450.
Measurement of variables
We test our hypotheses using a logistic regression model, with the dependent
variable coded 0 if the firm has no internal audit function and 1 if it uses internal
audit[8]. The use of both a separate risk management committee and a designated
risk manager are measured by dummy variables given the value 1 when a
committee (manager) exists and 0 otherwise. Similarly, a dummy variable is used to
classify firms in the finance industry. The level of accounts receivable and
inventories is measured as their joint proportion of total assets. Firm size is
measured by the total assets of the firm, while complexity is measured by the
number of business segments[9].
Dummy variables are used for an independent board chair and the existence of
an audit committee. Continuous variables are used for the percentage of
non-executive directors on the board, the size of the audit committee, the
percentage of independent directors on the audit committee[10], the percentage of
members with accounting and finance expertise and the number of audit committee
meetings during the year[11].
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Control variables
We use a number of proxies to measure the additional agency cost variables. The level
of directors’ shareholding is a dummy variable coded 0 if the total directors’
shareholding is less than 5 per cent of issued shares and 1 if it equals or exceeds 5 per
cent. Our measure of shareholder concentration is the proportion of shares held by the
top 20 shareholders. Debt is measured by the ratio of long-term liabilities to total assets
while our proxy for assets-in-place is property, plant and equipment divided by the
market value of assets[12].
We use the ratio of audit fees to total assets as our measure of audit fees. Previous
audit fee models have found that the size of the company accounts for most of the
variance in audit fees (Craswell et al., 1995; Carey et al., 2000a) and hence scaling by
total assets controls for the effect of size. Big Five auditor is a dummy variable coded 1
when the company’s auditor is a Big Five auditor and 0 when it is a smaller audit firm.
Sampling bias
To address the possibility of sampling bias, we compared the companies in our sample
with the population of listed companies in Australia. The mean size of companies listed
on the ASX in 2000, as measured by total assets, was $1,958 million, ranging from a
minimum of $63,000 to a maximum of $343 billion. Thus, our sample, with a mean of
$1,765 million and a range of $65,000-$177 billion, is slightly weighted towards smaller
companies. However, the percentage of companies in each two-digit ASX industry code
in our sample and in the population of listed companies are highly correlated with each
other (r ¼ 0.960, p ¼ 0.000), indicating that we have a fair representation of companies
across the 25 ASX industry codes.
Research model
The model tested is as follows:
IA ¼ b0 þ b1riskmgtcommitteeþ b2riskmanagerþ b3financeþ b4rec&invþ b5size
þ b6segmentsþ b7indepchairþ b8non–execsþ b9auditcommittee
þ b10ACindependenceþ b11ACexpertiseþ b12ACmeetings
þ b13directorshareholdingsþ b14top20ownershipþ b15debt
þ b16PPEþ b17auditfeesþ b18bigfiveþ e
where
IA ¼ internal audit/no internal audit
riskmgtcommittee ¼ a dummy variable given the value 1 where a separate risk
management committee exists and 0 otherwise
riskmanager ¼ a dummy variable given the value 1 when the company
has a risk manager and 0 otherwise
finance ¼ a dummy variable given the value 1 for a firm in the
finance industry and 0 otherwise
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rec&inv ¼ accounts receivable and inventories divided by total
assets
size ¼ natural log of total assets
segments ¼ number of business segments
indepchair ¼ a dummy variable given the value 1 when the board chair
is independent and 0 when he/she is not independent
non-execs ¼ the percentage of non-executive directors on the board
auditcommittee ¼ a dummy variable given the value 1 for the existence of an
audit committee and 0 for no audit committee
ACindependence ¼ the percentage of non-executive directors with no related
party transactions on the audit committee
ACexpertise ¼ the percentage of non-executive directors with financial
and/or auditing expertise
ACmeetings ¼ the number of audit committee meetings during the year
directorshareholdings ¼ a dummy variable given the value 1 when directors’
shareholdings equal or exceed 5 per cent of total shares
outstanding and 0 otherwise
top20ownership ¼ concentration of shareholders (measured by the
percentage of shares held by the top 20 shareholders)
debt ¼ long-term debt divided by total assets
PPE ¼ property, plant and equipment divided by the market
value of the firm (measured by market capitalization)
auditfees ¼ audit fees divided by total assets
bigfive ¼ a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big
Five auditor is used and 0 when a smaller audit firm is
used
Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table I reports the descriptive statistics for the variables in the model. Panel B
shows that only 154 firms (34 per cent) in the sample use internal audit. Of these,
115 (75 per cent) have their own internal audit function while 39 (25 per cent) outsource
their entire internal audit activities.
Panel B also shows that 60 per cent of firms in the sample have a separate
risk management committee or group. Further analysis indicates that, in more than
90 per cent of cases, the committee includes at least some board members. Only
111 (25 per cent) firms in the sample have a designated risk manager.
Panel A shows that total assets of firms in the sample ranged from $65,000 to
$177 billion, with a mean of $1,765 million. The mean number of business segments is
1.37, ranging from 1 to 7.
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Panel B indicates that 76 per cent of firms have an independent board chairperson
while from Panel A it can be seen that the mean percentage of non-executive
directors on the board is 85 per cent. Panel B also shows that some 77 per cent of
firms have an audit committee. Panel A indicates that, on average, only 46 per
cent of audit committee members are non-executives with no related party
transactions with the firm while less than 30 per cent of members have financial
or auditing expertise. The average committee meets slightly more than twice per
year.
With respect to the control variables, the mean percentage of shares held by the top
20 shareholders is 58 per cent (Panel A) while in 61 per cent of firms, the directors hold
more than 5 percent of shares issued (Panel B). Panel A shows that non-current
liabilities as a proportion of total assets range from 0 to 1.46; property, plant and
equipment as a proportion of the market value of the firm ranges from 0 to 7.31 times,
with a mean of 0.57. Audit fees as a percentage of total assets average 0.002 while 69
per cent of firms use a Big Five audit firm.
Table II reports the correlations between the continuous variables in the models.
Total assets are correlated with a number of other variables. Some of the audit
committee variables are also highly correlated. The highest correlation for the
independent variables is 0.538 between firm size and the number of audit committee
meetings. This suggests that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem in
interpreting the results of the regression analysis[13].
Logistic regression model
Table III presents the logistic regression model. This model identifies factors that are
associated with a company’s decision to either have its own internal audit function or
to outsource the function. The model is significant at p , 0.001 with a chi-square of
165.760 and pseudo R 2 of 0.426.
The existence of internal audit is significantly positively associated with the use
of a separate risk management committee ( p ¼ 0.005). This supports Hypothesis 1
and suggests that firms with an integrated risk management framework are more
likely to use internal audit. There is also a significant association between internal
audit and the use of a designated risk manager ( p ¼ 0.001), supporting Hypothesis
2. The association is positive, suggesting that internal audit is complementary to
other risk management mechanisms. Hypothesis 3 is also supported, with a
significant positive association between internal audit and firms in the financial
industry ( p ¼ 0.034). The significant positive association ( p ¼ 0.022) between the
use of internal audit and the level of receivables and inventory supports
Hypothesis 4 and suggests that internal audit is complementary to external audit
as a mechanism to monitor financial statement risks. Thus, all four of our risk
management hypotheses are supported, with the evidence strongly suggesting that
internal audit is an important internal mechanism for monitoring both business
and financial statement risks.
Recall that we argue that the management of a large diversified entity is more likely
to rely on internal audit to ensure that the internal control system is adequate. We
therefore predict an association between the size and complexity of the company and
the use of internal audit. Hypothesis 5 is strongly supported, with our results showing
a positive association between the size of the entity and the use of internal audit
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( p , 0.001). However, contrary to our expectations, the number of business segments
is not significantly associated with the use of internal audit, and hence Hypothesis 6 is
not supported.
Results for the use of internal audit as a corporate governance mechanism are
mixed. Hypotheses 7 and 9 are supported, with a significant positive association
between the existence of an internal audit function and both an independent board
chair ( p ¼ 0.024) and the existence of an audit committee ( p ¼ 0.033). However, there
is no support for Hypothesis 8 concerning an association between the number of
non-executive directors on the board and the existence of an internal audit function.
Further, there is no association between the use of internal audit and the independence
Variable Hypothesis Predicted sign Coefficient Wald statistic p *
Constant ? 27.712 39.691 ,0.001
Risk management committee H1 þ 0.700 6.447 0.005
Risk manager H2 þ 0.981 11.449 0.001
Financial industry H3 þ 1.056 3.295 0.034
Receivables and inventory H4 ? 1.329 5.253 0.022
Total assets H5 þ 0.465 19.587 ,0.001
Segments H6 þ 0.100 0.466 0.247
Independent board chair H7 þ 0.634 3.861 0.024
Percentage of
non-executive directors H8 þ 20.531 0.558 0.455
Audit committee H9 þ 0.890 3.380 0.033
AC Independence H10 þ 20.001 0.019 0.891
AC Expertise H10 þ 20.684 2.958 0.085
AC Meetings H10 þ 20.048 0.356 0.551
Directors’ shareholding Control 2 20.228 0.657 0.214
Top 20 ownership Control 2 0.0.574 0.998 0.318
Non-current liabilities Control þ 0.235 0.091 0.381
PPE Control 2 20.215 2.376 0.061
Audit fees Control ? 44.093 2.527 0.112
Big Five auditor Control ? 20.191 0.423 0.515
Notes: *One-tail test where direction predicted, otherwise two-tail; Number ¼ 450; Pseudo
R 2 ¼ 0.426; Chi-square ¼ 165.760; p , 0.001; Risk management committee ¼ 1 if company has a
separate risk management committee or group, and 0 otherwise; Risk manager ¼ the extent of the role
played in risk management by a designated risk manager (on a scale of 0-10); Financial industry ¼ 1 if
in the financial industry, and 0 otherwise; Receivables and inventory ¼ accounts receivable and
inventory divided by total assets; Total assets ¼ log of book value of assets at balance date;
Segments ¼ number of business segments; Independent board chair ¼ 1 if the chairman of the board
is independent, and 0 otherwise; Percentage of non-executive directors ¼ the percentage of
non-executive directors on the board; Audit committee ¼ 1 if an audit committee exists, and 0
otherwise; AC independence ¼ percentage of non-executives with no related party transactions on the
audit committee; AC expertise ¼ percentage of audit committee members with accounting and/or
finance expertise; AC meetings ¼ number of meetings of the audit committee during the year;
Directors’ shareholding ¼ 1 if directors’ shareholdings are at least 5 percent, and 0 otherwise; Top 20
ownership ¼ percentage of shares held by the top 20 shareholders; Non current
liabilities ¼ non-current liabilities divided by total assets; PPE ¼ property, plant and equipment
divided by market value of the firm; Audit fees ¼ annual audit fee divided by total assets; Big Five
auditor ¼ 1 if audited by a Big Five audit firm, and 0 otherwise
Table III.
Logistic regression
results (dependent
variable: existence of
internal audit)
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of the audit committee or the frequency of audit committee meetings. A marginally
significant association ( p ¼ 0.085) exists between audit committee expertise and the
use of internal audit but this is in the opposite direction to that predicted. This may
suggest that accounting and finance expertise on the audit committee substitutes for
the need to rely on internal audit. However, given the weak result, this interpretation
should be treated with caution. Overall, our results indicate that those variables
normally associated with audit committee effectiveness are not positively associated
with the use of internal audit and thus Hypothesis 10 is not supported.
Three of our four agency cost control variables are not significant, suggesting
that there is no association between the use of internal audit and a lower level of
director shareholdings, a lower concentration of large shareholders and the level of
debt. There is a marginally significant relation between the existence of an
internal audit function and the level of investment in assets-in-place and this is in
the expected direction ( p ¼ 0.061). Firms with a smaller investment in
assets-in-place appear to be more likely to use internal audit. Finally, neither of
the two control variables relating to external audit is significant at conventional
levels[14].
The size of internal audit
To explore whether the size of the internal audit function is associated with the
firm’s commitment to risk management, control and governance, we use ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression with the number of employees in the internal audit
function as the dependent variable. We eliminate from the sample those firms
which do not have an internal audit function or which outsource their entire
internal audit activities, giving a reduced sample of 115 firms. Further analysis of
this variable reveals that the mean number of internal audit staff is 5.28, ranging
from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 60. However, almost 60 per cent of firms
employ only one or two internal auditors while only 12 per cent have an internal
audit staff of ten or more and 7 per cent a staff of 20 or more. Because of this, we
set this variable to a maximum of 25 staff to overcome problems associated with
extreme values[15].
To avoid loss of power resulting from the reduced sample size, we first run the
regression with the same independent variables as used in the logistic regression
model. We then omit those variables which do not add explanatory power to the model.
The results of this reduced model are reported in Table IV. The model has an adjusted
R 2 of 0.505 compared to 0.406 for the full model.
The results show that, not surprisingly, the size of the firm is strongly associated
with the size of the internal audit function ( p , 0.001). A strong negative
association exists between the number of business segments ( p , 0.001),
suggesting that a larger internal audit function is associated with fewer
business segments. This is contrary to the expectation that the use of internal
audit is likely to increase with the complexity of the firm’s business structures.
There is also a negative relation between the size of the internal audit function
and the use of a Big Five auditor ( p ¼ 0.007). This suggests that internal audit
may be used as a substitute for a higher quality external auditor, with firms being
more prepared to use a smaller audit firm when they also use internal audit.
Further, a negative association is found between the size of internal audit and the
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proportion of assets in receivables and inventory ( p ¼ 0.030). Again, this result is
unexpected, given the assumption that overall audit risk increases when firms
have a greater investment in these current assets. There is a marginally positive
association between the number of audit committee meetings and the size of
internal audit ( p ¼ 0.069), suggesting a possible link between audit committee
diligence and a greater commitment to the use of internal audit. Finally, there is a
marginally negative association between the level of debt and the size of internal
audit ( p ¼ 0.077). This could indicate that firms with high levels of debt are
reluctant to invest in internal audit. While these findings are only tentative and
should be interpreted with caution given the small sample size, they suggest that
there are complex factors driving the level of investment in internal audit and
further research is needed to identify these.
Conclusion
This study explores why firms in Australia voluntarily choose to use internal
audit. We develop hypotheses based on internal audit as a mechanism for risk
management, control and corporate governance. We find support for our
hypotheses predicting an association between the use of internal audit and a
commitment to strong risk management. Consistent with Carcello et al. (2005), we
also find a strong association between internal audit and the size of the firm,
suggesting that smaller firms do not regard internal audit as cost effective. We do
not find a significant relation between internal audit and the complexity of the
firm’s business structures, while we obtain mixed results for the use of internal
audit as a corporate governance mechanism.
Our study indicates that a large proportion of Australian listed companies do not
use internal audit and many of those firms that do, have only one or two internal audit
staff. The implications of these findings for sound corporate governance are serious, as
Variable Coefficient t p *
Constant 28.568 22.983 0.004
Receivables and Inventory 23.632 22.201 0.030
Total assets 1.587 6.151 ,0.001
Segments 21.710 24.211 ,0.001
AC meetings 0.366 1.836 0.069
Directors’ shareholding 21.473 21.585 0.116
Non-current liabilities 24.501 21.788 0.077
PPE 20.835 21.407 0.162
Big Five auditor 22.907 22.747 0.007
Notes: Number ¼ 115; Adjusted R 2 ¼ 0.505; F ratio ¼ 15.518; p , 0.001; Receivables and
inventory ¼ accounts receivable and inventory divided by total assets; Total assets ¼ log of book
value of assets at balance date; Segments ¼ number of business segments; AC meetings ¼ number of
meetings of the audit committee during the year; Directors’ shareholding ¼ 1 if directors’
shareholdings are at least 5%, and 0 otherwise; Non current liabilities ¼ non-current liabilities divided
by total assets; PPE ¼ property, plant and equipment divided by market value of the firm; Big Five
auditor ¼ 1 if audited by a Big Five audit firm, and 0 otherwise
Table IV.
OLS regression results
(dependent variable: size
of internal audit function)
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it has been suggested that it is difficult for audit committees to be effective without the
support of internal audit. It would appear that there is considerable scope for
strengthening the relationship between internal audit, audit committees and external
auditors.
There are a number of limitations of our study which should be borne in mind when
interpreting our findings. The data collected by survey was necessarily limited in order
to restrict the length of the questionnaire and to maximize response rates. Further, the
possibility of sampling bias could limit the generalizability of our results. Some of the
variables in our model may not be good proxies for the factors we are measuring. For
example, the number of business segments may not reflect the true complexity of the
firm, while the proportion of non-executive directors on the board may not be a sound
measure of independence. Further, our measures of audit committee independence,
expertise and meeting frequency may not be good indicators of audit committee
effectiveness. Finally, our study was undertaken in 2000 and it is likely that the use of
internal audit by Australian companies has increased since that date as a result of
regulatory changes aimed at strengthening corporate governance (US Congress, 2002;
Commonwealth of Australia, 2004).
There are many opportunities for further research. Alternative research methods
such as interviews may help to further explain the reasons why companies choose to
use internal audit. Exploration of the complex interactions between the various
governance mechanisms of audit committees, external audit and internal audit is also
needed. The role of internal audit in risk management is relatively unexplored and is a
fruitful avenue for future research. Our unexpected results concerning the size of the
internal audit function and firm complexity and the level of receivables and inventory
warrant further research to identify possible reasons for the findings. Finally, research
in other jurisdictions, where audit committees are mandatory or where more emphasis
is placed on internal audit, could add further insight into the factors associated with the
voluntary use of internal audit.
Notes
1. The ASX amended its listing rules in 2003 to require any company that was included in the
S&P/ASX All Ordinaries Index at the beginning of its financial year to have an audit
committee during that year. Further, in May 2003, the ASX Corporate Governance Council
released a best practice guide which recommends that all companies have an audit
committee comprising at least three members.
2. The ASX Corporate Governance Council (2003) now encourages companies, particularly
large companies, to have an internal audit function.
3. Other reasons for expecting an association between the use of internal audit and firm size
arise because the net benefits of monitoring are expected to increase with size. First, the total
amount of potential wealth transfer from capital providers to management is greater for
large firms (Chow, 1982). Second, economies of scale should result in the marginal cost of
operating a monitoring and bonding system decreasing with firm size (Menon and Williams,
1994; Anderson et al. 1993; Chow, 1982).
4. Independent directors are those non-executive directors who have no relationship with the
firm beyond the role of director (NYSE and NASD, 1999; Davidson et al., 2005). Owing to
data restrictions, this study uses the proportion of non-executive directors on the board as a
proxy for independence. We acknowledge that this measure would include non-executives
who are not truly independent.
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5. We refer to the “Big Five” auditing firms since the study was undertaken prior to the demise
of Arthur Andersen.
6. This centre provided financial support for the survey, which was conducted by the two
authors of the paper.
7. This information was considered less sensitive than questions about the internal audit
budget and hence was chosen as a measure of internal audit size in an attempt to maximize
the response rate.
8. This variable includes those companies with their own internal audit function and
those which indicated that they outsourced their entire internal audit activities. We
tested the model omitting the companies that outsourced and obtained qualitatively
similar results.
9. Qualitatively similar results are obtained when we use revenues as an indictor of size and
number of controlled entities and number of foreign subsidiaries as measures of business
complexity.
10. Audit committee independence is measured as non-executive directors who do not have
related party transactions with the firm.
11. We also used dichotomous variables for a majority of non-executive directors on the board
and for the independence and expertise of the audit committee. None of the alternative
variables exercised significant influence on our reported results.
12. Our results are qualitatively similar when we use a continuous variable for directors’
shareholdings and also when we use alternative measures of assets-in-place (e.g. market to
book value of equity).
13. As an additional test for multicollinearity we ran alternative versions of the logistic
regression model, omitting one of the highly correlated measures. The results were
qualitatively similar to those reported.
14. As Wallace and Kreutzfeldt (1991) found that profitability and liquidity were associated
with the use of internal audit, we tested our model including variables for return on
assets and working capital ratios (current assets divided by current liabilities). Neither
of these variables was significant and they did not add any explanatory power to the
models.
15. There are four firms with internal audit functions in excess of 25 staff and these were set at
25. This is a statistical technique known as winsorizing and is designed to overcome the
problem of extreme observations (Gu et al., 2005).
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